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reference date. Four out of eleven achieved an average score of 95 five
months after the reference date (counting peaks and troughs together)
noneearlier. If all scores for all months are averaged for each fore-
caster, the scores range from 44 to 71. The same publication that scored
highest for timing also scored highest for degree of certainty. Panel B
of Chart 1-5 compares the "best" and the "worst" analysts for 1948—61.
It also shows the average pattern for 1957—61 of the two publications
that depended heavily on business cycle indicators.
All the average scores, for both accuracy of dating and degree of
certainty, are subject to a serious limitation. As Charts 1-6 and 1-7 show,
there is great variation among the scores for different turning points, not
only the systematic differences between peaks and troughs already
noted, but also differences among individual peaks and individual





Scores for both dating and certainty run lower for peaks than for
troughs, and among the four peaks since World War II, they run lower
for 1948 than for any other year except 1960. Although there is nothiiig
to choose between the certainty patterns for 1948 and 1957 shown in
Chart 1-7, the 1948 scores for dating are noticeably lower (see Chart
1-6). Of the 80 scores for dating near the 1948 peak (eight forecasters,
ten months), 75 were zero. (Seventy-one were zero because no forecast
was made.)
25Thisincludes one publication not used in the averages shown in Charts
1-4 and I-S. The omission of this publication reduces the number with an average
of 95fivemonths after the reference date to three in ten.Recognition Pattern. Chronological Review 25
A reading of the quotations suggests that, although contemporary ob-
servers were prompt to recognize signs of cyclical weakness, they were
slow to realize that a cyclical recession had begun. At the peak of the
reference cycle in November 1948, comments ranged from, "The cyclical
outlook has become more weighted in the direction of recession some-
time in 1949" to "The boom will probably continue." During December,
January, and February, there was a slow drift toward more pessimistic
comments. Not until four and a half months after the peak of the busi-
ness cycle did any of the sources studied decide that a recession was
under way. In April, recession talk became more definite, but doubts
persisted. Something like unanimity was reached only in May. It should
be noted that the NBER method of dating peaks and troughs gives
preference to the later of two equal months. In this case, October 1948
was a close runner-up to November for reference cycle peak. Historically,
contractions have sometimes been as short as seven or eight months,
and under the NBER definition of business cycles, a contraction might
be even shorter. Even with allowance for the information lag, there was
enough data by the end of June to establish that the contraction was a
historical fact without any element of prediction. All in all, recognition
of the 1948 peak hardly constituted a triumph for the art of forecasting.
Low scores for dating and certainty, however, do not of themselves
prove that the performance of business analysts was poor. Some con-
tractions start so slowly, as in 1960, that they are inherently difficult to
distinguish from lulls until four or five months after the peak. But the
turn of 1948 was not of that sort. Information that could have been
available three months after the peak was more clear-cut and decisive
than for most peaks and troughs since World War 11.26
Why,then, did contemporary observers have so much trouble recog-
nizing what was going on? Statistical reporting and analysis were not so
highly developed then as now. The postwar work on business cycle in-
dicators by Moore, Shiskin, and others had not been published. But
the 1948 recognition record does not look good even in comparison
with the earlier case of 1929. There must be some more basic explana-
tion.
26Comparethe charts for three months after each peak and trough of Julius
Shiskin, Signals of Recession and Recovery, An Experiment with Monthly Re-
porting, Occasional Paper 77, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1961, pp. 93—99 (see also pp. 57—58 and 100—105). Cf. Chart I-i of this paper,
especially the leads of some of the series.26 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
When conditions change violently, the forecaster is at a disadvantage.
He cannot tell to what extent his past knowledge isstill valid. The
later 1940's followed a decade and a half of unusually rapid change in
American economic life. The experience of living through a depression
of unprecedented depth changed people's conduct. The structure of the
economic system had been transformed, and the war had altered eco-
nomic variables in ways that had only distant parallels with the previous
world war. At first, forecasters did not realize how much more dif-
ficult their problem had become, and they plunged confidently ahead
with predictions. But the widely publicized forecasts of severe depres-
sion to follow World War II turned out to be ingloriously wrong. Those
forecasters who in 1945 had assumed that the consumption function of
the 1930's would still hold good came to grief, as did those who as-
sumed that chronic stagnation of investment would reassert itself. So
too did those who thought in terms of primary and secondary postwar
depressions. Later, in 1947, a decline in industrial production was
widely misinterpreted as the beginning of recession. Instead, it was fol-
lowed by another bout of inflation. Again, in early 1948, a break in
farm prices raised the question of recession prematurely. By the time
the downturn actually came, commentators and forecasters had learned
to be cautious. Their uncertainty was reinforced by the President, who
continued to advocate an anti-inflationary program. But slow recogni-
tion was more than just a matter of caution born of experience. Analysts
faced a genuinely difficult problem. The inflation that followed the 7 per
cent drop in the index of industrial production in 1947 (a drop that was
largely obliterated as a result of the 1953 revision of the seasonal adjust-
ment) gave them ample reason to wonder if the comparatively small
decline in the winter of 1949 might not have a similar sequel. Knowledge
that government expenditures were to rise sharply worked in the same
direction. The structural changes in the economy raised the question of
whether the business cycle was a thing of the past. And finally, the ex-
perience of 1929—48 had led observers to think in terms of deep depres-
sion and rapid inflation, not of business cycles with the mild contractions
that have characterized postwar experience.
The 1949 Trough
Among troughs, the scores for 1949 are lowest, though the difference
from 1958 is slight. (To be precise, the averages of the certainty scoresRecognition Pattern: Chronological Review 27
for the two years are virtually the same, with the average for dating
somewhat higher for 1958.) The scores might have been even lower for
1949, especially the certainty scores, had the trough not been double-
bottomed.27 The first bottom came in July. The expansion that ensued
was soon interrupted by strikes in coal and steel. The second bottom,
in October, is the one designated by the NBER as the reference cycle
trough.
Contemporary observers were quick to note the end of cyclical con-
traction but slow to predict cyclical expansion. Although in July some
commentators were expecting further contraction, others noted signs of
recovery. In the next two or three months there was a gradual increase
in optimism tempered by fears the recovery would be short-lived. In
November, as the country began recovering from the strikes, the com-
ments on the outlook either were ambiguous or portended a sidewise
movement. In December the typical view was optimistic about the first
half of 1950 and doubtful about the second half. In January, a future
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, though expecting busi-
ness to improve over the next few months, felt the contemporary CEA's
conclusion that the economy was definitely recovering from the con-
traction was "based on very slight evidence." During the next few
months, the general pessimism about the second half of 1950 gave way
to optimism.
In the neighborhood of the 1948 peak, contemporary observers did
not seem to be thinking in business cycle terms. The same is true of
1949—50. In 1949, observers were rather quicker than in 1948 to per-
ceive what had just happened, but they were slower to draw inferences
of a cyclical nature. In fact, so far as I have been able to discover, none
of the publications in my sample used cyclical language.
The 1953 Peak
Among peaks, the highest scores for both timing and recognition were
given for 1953, as Charts 1-6 and 1-7 indicate, even though these
27Theeffect of the double bottom on dating scores was mixed, since one of
the publications dated the trough in July and suffered lower scores accordingly,
perhaps undeservedly. But the belief that the "true" trough had been in July
made for greater certainty that expansion was under way once the October
strikes were over, a circumstance reinforcing the purely mechanical effects that
a later reference date has in raising certainty scores by shifting forward the
ten-month period used for scoring purposes.28 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
scores run lower than for any trough. The NBER has dated the 1953
peak in July, a decision that has not been challenged. A number of
sources gave early warning. In June every member of a group of fore-
casters studied by Zarnowitz predicted that industrial production would
decline in the second half of the year. Moreover, the amplitude of the
mean of their forecasts approximated what actually happened. In July
comments generally pointed downward though they were not unani-
mous. In August they were rather definite about expecting decline but
indefinite or conflicting about whether the decline would constitute a
cyclical contraction or recession. In September they were still indefinite.
Insofar as recognition of the contraction increased in October, it revealed
itself mainly in the expressed expectation that the decline would be mild.
But at the end of the month, one source used the expression, "now that
the decline has come...." DuringNovember, most of the others made
similar statements, though the language was often indirect or ambigu-
ous.
Improvement in recognition over 1948 was marked. During the
month of the peak, and even before, there was widespread knowledge,
or at least fear, that business activity was about to head downward.
From then on, however, the conviction that that was indeed what was
happening strengthened slowly. Although, in terms of confirmation,
they did scarcely any better than in 1948 in giving early warning, the
sources studied, with few exceptions, did well.
Why the improvement? Between the peaks of 1948 and 1953, Geof-
frey H. Moore, C. Ashley Wright, and Thor Hultgren had published re-
suits of their investigations of business cycle indicators.28 One of the
sources studied made direct use of Wright's analyses. There is evidence
that the Council of Economic Advisers made use of the NBER indicators.
Other publications on business cycles together with the experience of
1948—49 may have made observers more sensitive to cyclical downturns.
But it is hard to believe that the growth of knowledge, which is slow,
could account for more than part of the improvement.
The 1953 turning point was inherently easier to anticipate than the
one in 1948. Although the inflation of 1946—48 was bound to come to
28 Geoffrey H. Moore, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions,
New York, NBER Occasional Paper 31, 1950; C. Ashley Wright, "Business Cycle
Research and Business Policy," Conference on Business Cycles, New York, NBER,
1951, pp. 339—368; Thor Hultgren, Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of In-
dustrial Corporations, New York, NBER Occasional Paper 32, 1950.Recognition Pattern: Chronological Review 29
an end as rising prices reduced the value of liquid assets, as rising civilian
output alleviated the most pressing shortages, and as the proportion of
disposable income saved returned to normal, nevertheless the time when
inflationary pressures would subside was difficult to foretell; and diagnosis
in November 1948 was made especially difficult by continuing short-
ages of automobiles, the tax cut of 1948, and the prospective rise in
government expenditures. Moreover, there was no reason in 1948 to
think inventories were out of line with output or sales. The Korean war,
in contrast, left no legacy of shortages and accumulated liquid assets.
The end of the war was easy to foresee, as was the lag of tax cuts
behind the reduction of government expenditures. Before the peak, in-
ventories built up unintentionally. That the Federal Reserve System
had tightened credit too much was so obvious that it moved to relax
credit even before the downturn. In 1953, unlike early 1949, no one
questioned whether or not there would be another burst of inflation
simply because there was no reason to raise the question. Consequently,
the signals of impending cyclical contraction were easier to believe.
The 1954 Trough
The scores for degree of certainty in the vicinity of the 1954 trough
average higher than for any other turn between 1948 and 1961; the
scores for accuracy of dating were second highest. To some extent the
seemingly good performance of the business analysts may be the result
of a close decision on the date of the trough. The trough was flat-bot-
tomed. In the successive revisions of GNP, its low has shifted from
the second quarter of 1954 to the first, then to the third, back again
to the first, and finally to the second. The FRB index of industrial pro-
duction has twice had its trough relocated through revision. The NBER
has dated the reference cycle trough in August. The date may get
changed to May, June, or July when it is re-examined in the light of the
latest statistics, although the troughs in the various series of employment
and unemployment (inverted) came in July, August, and September. An
earlier date for the reference trough would shift the pattern shown in
Chart 1-7 downward to the right and alter the relative standing of 1954.
Dating the trough in May would make the certainty pattern the lowest
of the four instead of the highest.
As early as May, or even earlier, some contemporary observers thought30 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
that the cyclical contraction was coming to an end. They correctly an-
ticipated a prolonged period of bottoming but underestimated the
speed the recovery would attain thereafter. Although many observers
continued to be indecisive about expansion (as distinct from the ending
of contraction), more and more of them became definite during Sep-
tember, October, and November, and they were more inclined to think
in business cycle terms than in 1949.
The 1957 Peak
Though the improvement in scores in 1953 over 1948 was partly the
result of a situation inherently easier to diagnose, it seems also to reflect
improvement in the ability of business analysts to recognize downturns.
The scores fell off in 1957, and fell still further in 1960. Did the falling
off result from a decline in ability to recognize peaks when they occur
or from cyclical developments that were harder to assess?
The NBER dates the 1957 peak in July, a close choice over August.
Many forecasters gave warning of a cyclical turn misleadingly early,
well before the first month for which we have assigned scores. Though
the initial scores for certainty averaged higher than at any other peak,
warnings of recession were less frequent three months before the peak
than they had been earlier and increased very slowly during the next
several months. At the peak in July, commentators were universally
aware that business had slowed down but, with certain exceptions to be
discussed later, did not conclude that a recession was beginning. Many
were noncommittal, others optimistic. There was a shift toward pes-
simism in August, September, and October, but the tenor of reports on
the outlook was still indecisive. On October 30, President Eisenhower
acknowledged publicly, "the economy is, in effect, taking a breather."
After that, one might have expected recognition of the cyclical down-
turn to become universal quickly. Actually, though certainty scores for
November spurted upward, there were at least two holdouts (scores
of 35 and 50), with the lowest score going to the publication with the
best over-all recognition record for 1948—61.
Why was the certainty record of the eight poorer in 1957 than in
1953? Testimony in early June of 1957 by a panel of forecasters before
a Congressional committee is revealing. No member of the panel wasRecognition Pattern: Chronological Review 31
expecting recession. Their testimony shows that they were misinformed
about investment in inventories, investment in plant and equipment, and
federal spending. Surveys misled them into thinking spending on plant
and equipment would continue to rise slightly during the remainder of
the year. The forecasters thought government spending was rising. One
of them feared inflation. He thought net disinvestment in inventories was
taking place during the current (second) quarter. He concluded that by
the end of the year cessation of inventory liquidation would give demand
a boost. Events turned out just the opposite. Instead of liquidation, there
was net accumulation of inventories during the first three quarters of
the year; decumulation instead of accumulation took place in the fourth.
A sharp cut in defense procurement (which the panel could hardly have
known was about to begin) and a downward slide of capital investment
helped precipitate the recession.
Forecasters always have to work with inaccurate information. Usually
some of the errors offset each other. In this case, they all worked in
the same direction. Of the three errors, one was of decisive importance.
In May the Department of Commerce had published an estimate for
the first quarter showing a substantial negative figure for inventory in-
vestment, leading forecasters to think the economy had already weathered
an inventory adjustment. Revised figures now show substantial positive
inventory investment.
Failure to give clearer warning that a contraction might be under
way was also associated with the persistence of inflation, in the form of
rising consumer prices, after the cyclical peak was passed. The concern
for fighting inflation, felt during the summer and early fall by prominent
government officials including the President and the Federal Reserve
Board (which raised discount rates in August), communicated itself to
the public and permeated the background of all discussions of the out-
look. Professional forecasters presumably were familiar with the fact
that consumer prices lag behind wholesale prices. But the climate of
opinion can influence them too.29
If the President's influence depressed certainty scores during the
three months after the peak, it also contributed to their rapid rise in
29Itcan also affect what they are willing to say in print. If, as I suspect, most
of the publications reviewed were sympathetic with Eisenhower's efforts to stop
inflation, they might have been reluctant to embarrass him.32 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
November. Seldom is it possible to pinpoint so definitely the time at
which knowledge of a cyclical turning point became general. Prior to
October 30, nearly everybody had hesitated to say definitely that there
was a recession. After Eisenhower's "breather" remark and the re-
duction of discount rates by the Federal Reserve two weeks later, there
was less hesitation. But most of the credit belongs to the Council of
Economic Advisers (whose briefing led to the "breather" remark), to
the statistical indicators they made use of,3° and to the Federal Reserve
Board.
The 1958 Trough
The scores for the 1958 trough were lower than those for 1954, es-
pecially with respect to certainty, and lower than those for 1961, es-
pecially with respect to dating. In late 1957, almost as soon as the
existence of recession became confirmed, a number of forecasters pre-
dicted that it would be brief and mild. In a loose and vague way,
therefore, they gave early warning of the trough of April 1958. But the
actual upturn came sooner than expected. When it came, commentators
were reasonably prompt to confirm it.
At the end of February, a prominent economist thought there was
"real danger...ofa cumulative breakdown in the economy." During
the trough month of April, there was general recognition that the con-
traction was slowing down but little realization that it was about to give
way to expansion. Comments in May resembled those of April, yet con-
veyed an air of greater hopefulness. By the middle of June, improve-
ment was widely recognized, but views diverged as to whether it would
continue. Five out of the ten certainty scores were less than 50. Only
one of the sources studied said flatly, "the upturn is now a fact and
not just an expectation." July brought many converts to the view that
expansion was under way, though none put it as unqualifiedly as the
passage just quoted. Only one score was now below 50. In August the
remainder of the sources studied became converted. The lowest score
was 65, with two scores of 100.
Inthe fall of 1957, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers asked
the Census Bureau to develop a monthly report on indicators. The request led
eventually to publication of Business Cycle Developments. (Julius Shiskin, Signals
of Recession and Recovery: An Experiment with Monthly Reporting, New York,
NBER Occasional Paper 77, 1961, p.1.)Recognition Pattern. Chronological Review 33
The 1960 Peak
The scores for both dating and certainty were lower in the vicinity of
the 1960 peak than for any other turning point, peak or trough, of the
eight between 1948 and 1961. Although all turning points are hard to
predict, the 1960 reversal was harder than most.31 A severe steel strike
in 1959 interfered with interpretation of the business cycle indicators,
many of which exhibited early peaks that were obviously spurious.
When some of them again showed local peaks in the restocking period
after the strike, the signals were neither unmistakable nor unambiguous.
A bulge in inventory investment was expected to give the economy
a strong upward thrust in the first half of 1960. The aftermath of the
restocking period was expected to be a decline in inventory investment
with unfavorable repercussions on the economy as a whole. But fore-
casters drew the conclusion that the outcome would be a slower rate of
expansion rather than an immediate downturn, with a strong possibility
of a recession beginning late in 1960 or early in 1961. Their logic seems
at fault. Their diagnoses implied that the danger point would come at
midyear rather than at year's end.
Expectation of a continued advance in the second half of 1960 re-
sulted from specific analysis of the forces at work, particularly from
surveys showing that businesses were planning to increase spending on
plant and equipment. Some forecasters also expected that inventory ac-
cumulation would continue, though at a reduced rate, in the second half
of the year.32
The NI3ER has designated May as the reference cycle peak. The date
31 These statements are subject to an important qualification. Two economists
as early as the spring of 1959 were expecting a downturn in the spring of 1960,
and a third warned Vice President Nixon in February 1960 of the danger. The
predictions of all three were strongly influenced by the tight money policy of
the Federal Reserve System.
32 The forecast of continued expansion throughout 1960 was not unreason-
able. The upper turning point was so flat and the ensuing contraction was so
mild that, one may infer, absence of any of the deflationary forces actually at
work would have prevented the cyclical turn. One of the factors at work was
the failure of consumer spending to rise in the third quarter in spite of a rise
in disposable personal income. This development and its consequences could
hardly have been predicted with the forecasting tools available in 1960 (or now,
for that matter). Nevertheless, the forecasters ought to have been able to give
clearer warning to the effect that, though the outlook was favorable, the odds in
favor of recession were by no means negligible. (I am indebted to Dennis R.
Starleaf's unpublished study of the 1960 turn in this connection.)34 Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts
is reasonable, although a critic has proposed July as a possible al-
ternative.33 A July date would make the certainty pattern shown in
Chart 1-7 look better but not especially good. Even among minor cycles,
the contraction of 1960—61 was unusually short and mild. As might be
expected from these characteristics, the turn was flat rather than sharp,
making it intrinsically hard to recognize.
At the beginning of 1960, as already noted, the standard forecast
called for vigorous expansion in the first half of the year. As early as
February, there were expressions of mild disappointment. "High plateau"
was the common expression in March. In the following month comments
were, on the whole, indecisive. During May, the peak month, comments
ranged from considerable optimism through mild optimism to dubious-
ness. During the next three months, there were numerous revisions of
views, some in one direction, some in the other. On balance there was
some shift toward pessimism, but the eight publications for which scores
are available from 1948 on did not achieve an average score greater
than 50 for certainty till September. Despite the difficulties of recogniz-
ing a flat turning point, it is surprising that recognition did not become
general during October. To what extent the political campaign inhibited
facing facts is hard to say. Not until election day could recognition of
the contraction be considered general, and then only on the assumption
that some sources knew more than they had put into print.
The 1961 Trough
The turn for which scores ran lowest was followed by the one for which
they ran highest. The scores for degree of certainty in the vicinity of
the 1961 trough, though good, averaged lower than in 1954, but the
dating scores were much higher (see Charts 1-6 and 1-7).
The circumstances that made recognition of the 1960 peak difficult
helped make recognition of the 1961 trough easy. The flat top of the
1960 peak and the mildness of the ensuing contraction made it difficult
to know whether there was a contraction at all but made it natural to
expect that, if there were one, it would end soon. Moreover, the 1960—
61 contraction was something of an accident. In a situation basically
In the latest revision of the national income accounts, the peak in GNP
in constant dollars comes in the first quarter, making a date for the reference
cycle peak as late as July implausible. (Survey of Current Business, August 1965,
p. 27.) The quarter-to-quarter variations, however, are so slight that little con-
fidence can be put in the estimate of where the peak in real GNP belongs.False Warnings 35
favorable to continued expansion, exogenous disturbances barely suf-
ficed to set in motion the mechanism of inventory contraction. The
contraction could not get very far in the face of automatic stabilizers, re-
versal of monetary policy, increasing net exports, and an early rise in
defense orders. The basically favorable situation made it easy to antici-
pate an early upturn. The trough, however, came sooner than most ob-
servers expected; hence, the dating scores shown in Chart 1-6 were not
especially high until one month before the trough.
The favorable circumstances resulted in a sharp upturn, helping to
make the trough easy to date and recognize. The bottom started like a
U and ended like a V. Since, under NBER procedures, the later date is
preferred in doubtful cases, a trough that is half U and half V, in that
order, does not give rise to difficulties. The NBER reference date of
February has not been challenged.
In November and December, almost as soon as the various com-
mentators declared a recession was under way, they predicted that it
would be short and mild. In January the most common expectation was
still for a mild recession, with an upturn by midyear. During the month
of the cyclical trough, there was, with some exceptions, a tendency to ad-
vance the date of the expected upturn. In March, with varying degrees
of certainty, all the sources surveyed expressed the view that the upturn
was at hand or, at the least, not far off. During April, they became more
certain, week by week. During the first part of May, lingering doubts
about the reality of the upturn tended to disappear. The question shifted
to how fast recovery was proceeding. The answer given was that it was
proceeding more rapidly than most observers had expected.
7
False Warnings
False warnings may be considered reverse recognition. This chapter
examines some of the most flagrant cases. Our method of scoring for
accuracy of dating cannot, of course, be readily adapted to false warn-